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different pathogens than those 
species, and alter the tickborne 
disease landscape. We believe it’s 
essential for practitioners and the 
public to develop a heightened 
awareness of the health risks as­
sociated with emer­
gent tick vectors such 
as the lone star tick 
and their potential 
for changing the dynamics of 
tickborne diseases in the north­
eastern United States and else­
where.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors 
are available at NEJM.org.
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Last year, the world marked 100 years since the beginning 
of the 1918 influenza pandemic. 
Over a little more than 2 years, 
the virus infected more than half 
a billion people, spreading to re­
mote parts of the globe and caus­
ing more deaths than either World 
War I or World War II — and 
possibly more than both com­
bined.1 There have been four ad­
ditional influenza pandemics in 
the past century (the most recent 
being the 2009 H1N1 pandemic), 
although none has caused the 
same scale of infection and mor­
tality as the 1918 pandemic. Virol­
ogists studying influenza are clear, 
however: another pandemic will 
hit again.
Seasonal influenza also repre­
sents an important yet often un­
derestimated global health burden. 
Although the annual cycle of in­
fluenza seasons is predicable, the 
severity of a given influenza strain 
and precisely when it will arrive 
are less certain. The Southern 
Hemisphere’s influenza season 
arrived earlier in 2019 than in 
the past 19 years. Australia had 
its highest number of confirmed 
influenza cases on record, most 
of them influenza A H3N2, al­
though it wasn’t a particularly 
severe year in terms of the num­
ber of deaths and intensive care 
admissions. Despite the common 
belief that influenza trends in 
the Southern Hemisphere predict 
those in the Northern Hemisphere, 
there is no set pattern in the di­
rection of virus migration for the 
current circulating H3N2.
Given the ongoing threat posed 
by influenza, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) earlier this 
year released its Global Influenza 
Strategy 2019–2030. Its goals in­
clude reducing the burden of sea­
sonal influenza, minimizing the 
risk of zoonotic influenza, and 
mitigating the effects of pandem­
ic influenza.
The new strategy is a welcome 
step. However, we believe that it 
should address several current and 
emerging challenges to prevent­
ing and responding to influenza, 
among them potential barriers to 
pathogen sharing, use of influenza 
genetic­sequence data for vaccine 
development, and global response 
capabilities, including medical 
countermeasures. Although these 
challenges may be addressed in 
other ongoing initiatives, influ­
enza preparedness and response 
strategies must be sufficiently 
agile for new technologies, trans­
parent for accountability, and 
equitable for global health justice.
Rapid and comprehensive shar­
ing of influenza viruses among 
countries, researchers, pharmaceu­
tical and diagnostic manufac­
turers, and the WHO is vital to 
global pandemic preparedness. 
Virus sharing facilitates surveil­
lance of emerging and reemerg­
ing viruses with pandemic poten­
tial, enables the development of 
seasonal and pandemic influenza 
vaccines, and contributes to the 
development of medical counter­
measures. Global pandemic re­
sponse also requires the equitable 
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sharing of vaccines, diagnostics, 
antivirals, and data resulting from 
virus sharing.
The Nagoya Protocol could com­
plicate the virus­sharing process, 
however. This agreement among 
123 countries, which entered into 
force in 2014, aims to ensure 
that the benefits that arise from 
the use of genetic resources are 
shared equitably. But a study pre­
pared by the WHO noted con­
cern that implementation of the 
protocol could slow or limit virus 
sharing.2 Although the agreement 
excludes resources that are spe­
cifically covered by other legal 
instruments — as pandemic in­
fluenza viruses are by the WHO’s 
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
(PIP) Framework — consensus 
on the exclusion of such viruses 
hasn’t been made explicit. In ad­
dition, the terms of the Nagoya 
Protocol still apply to seasonal 
influenza viruses. The WHO’s 
strategy states that the agency is 
to “provide leadership on global 
public health matters regarding 
the sharing of influenza data 
and viruses, including within the 
context of other international bod­
ies and agreements,” such as the 
Nagoya Protocol, but no addition­
al details are provided regarding 
how the WHO will seek to limit 
the protocol’s effect on virus shar­
ing and pandemic preparedness.
The move toward using influ­
enza genetic­sequence data for 
developing vaccines represents an­
other challenge affecting influen­
za preparedness and response. In 
2016, the PIP Framework review 
group noted that genetic­sequence 
data could in some cases be used 
instead of virus samples during 
pandemic risk assessment and for 
vaccine development.3 The PIP 
Framework encourages all coun­
tries to share genetic­sequence 
data. But unlike pandemic influ­
enza virus samples, such data 
aren’t included in the framework’s 
access and benefit­sharing regime, 
and the WHO’s strategy gives 
limited recognition to the cur­
rent and potential effects of the 
use of genetic­sequence data on 
influenza preparedness and re­
sponse.
The strategy notes that the 
“underpinning principle” of the 
PIP Framework is that “rapid and 
timely sharing of influenza virus­
es with human pandemic poten­
tial and genetic sequence data 
must be pursued on an equal 
footing with the sharing of bene­
fits.” We believe, however, that 
long­term planning for influenza 
needs to anticipate changes in vi­
rus sharing and the challenges 
and opportunities associated with 
the use of genetic­sequence data. 
In particular, if vaccine manufac­
turers are increasingly able to rely 
solely on genetic­sequence data to 
develop products, they will no 
longer need to provide benefits in 
accordance with the PIP Frame­
work.4 Since the adoption of the 
framework, 13 vaccine and anti­
viral manufacturers have entered 
into agreements that the WHO 
has reported would provide the 
agency with 400 million doses 
of pandemic influenza vaccine, 
10 million treatment courses of 
antiviral drugs, 250,000 diagnos­
tic kits, and 25 million syringes 
in the event of a pandemic. As vac­
cine development and manufactur­
ing using genetic­sequence data 
move closer to becoming viable, 
both virus­sharing obligations and 
the millions of vaccine doses that 
have been committed to the WHO 
could be under threat.
Access to countermeasures is at 
the heart of the WHO’s strategy, 
which includes objectives of ex­
panding seasonal­vaccine uptake 
and ensuring equitable access to 
vaccines and antiviral drugs and 
other treatments during a pan­
demic. However, scholars have 
expressed concern that during a 
severe pandemic, countries with 
the capacity to manufacture pan­
demic influenza vaccines may re­
strict vaccine exports until domes­
tic demand has been satisfied.5 
These concerns aren’t reflected in 
the strategy. To model scenarios 
in which governments might con­
sider restricting exports, the WHO 
could conduct robust, open simu­
lations of the effectiveness of the 
PIP Framework that involve vac­
cine manufacturers, governments, 
and the WHO. We believe that the 
WHO should develop strategies 
for mitigating the effects of vac­
cine­export restrictions and for 
distributing vaccines once com­
mitments are met.
Once a pandemic begins, a vac­
cine probably won’t be available 
for at least several months. Non­
pharmaceutical interventions will 
therefore be crucial, particularly 
in developing countries that are 
especially vulnerable to pandemic 
influenza. Although nonpharma­
ceutical interventions form part 
of the response outlined in the 
strategy, the document offers little 
guidance or detail regarding these 
methods. We believe that the WHO 
should commit to providing tech­
nical support for social­distancing 
measures and community­based 
interventions during a pandemic. 
Guidance could address not only 
the public health elements of a 
response but also the importance 
of evidence­ and human­rights–
based approaches to nonpharma­
ceutical interventions.
Finally, the strategy misses an 
opportunity to address ongoing 
barriers to executing components 
of the International Health Reg­
ulations (IHR), an agreement 
adopted in 2005 with a goal of 
preventing, detecting, and respond­
ing to the spread of disease with­
out unnecessarily interfering with 
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international travel and trade. 
Under the IHR, countries are re­
quired to meet certain laboratory, 
surveillance, notification, and re­
porting requirements. The strat­
egy notes that all state parties 
were required to meet these ob­
ligations by 2012; however, it 
doesn’t address the challenges 
most countries have experienced 
trying to fully implement the IHR. 
Acknowledging these challenges 
would allow the WHO to evalu­
ate which core capacities might 
be prioritized for influenza pre­
paredness.
In creating its Global Influenza 
Strategy 2019–2030, the WHO has 
shown the ambition and fore­
sight required to ensure that the 
world can be better prepared for 
the next influenza pandemic and 
the ongoing burden of seasonal 
influenza. But additional chal­
lenges will test the effectiveness 
of the strategy unless efforts are 
made to ensure that they are also 
addressed.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors 
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Sir William Osler died on De­cember 29, 1919, at his home 
in Oxford from hemorrhage after 
surgery for loculated empyema. 
Two days later, Richard C. Cabot 
(1868–1939) wrote in the New York 
Evening Post: “I doubt if any single 
man has ever so deeply influenced 
any other profession.” Cabot’s was 
among the first of more than 
400 obituaries and posthumous 
tributes, including a five­page 
obituary in the Journal. Few, if any, 
physicians have been more wide­
ly loved by their contemporaries. 
A century later, Osler is revered 
for his efforts to place clinical 
medicine on a rational founda­
tion (in part through the multi­
ple editions of his Principles and 
Practice of Medicine, first published 
in 1892), his transformation of 
graduate medical education (with 
the 1910 Flexner Report later for­
malizing the Hopkins model of 
critical, hospital­based teaching), 
and his attempt to keep medicine 
informed by a sense of human­
ism, even as it became ever more 
scientific.
Osler was many things to many 
people, but his ultimate gift to 
physicians was the sense of be­
longing to a splendid profession 
committed to the public interest. 
In addresses and essays, and in 
taking a celebratory approach to 
the history of medicine, Osler 
nurtured the notion of the medi­
cal profession as a global force 
for human betterment. He some­
times conceptualized the profes­
sion as an apostolic succession of 
cultured clinicians dating back to 
Hippocrates. He gave physicians 
what certain national historians 
gave their countries: warm feel­
ings of togetherness, pride, and 
purpose.1 He accomplished this 
task in part by deploying medical 
history and medical biography, 
which in his hands often amount­
ed to hagiographic endorsements 
of what we would today call “role 
models.”
As Osler opined in his address 
on “Books and Men,” at the dedi­
cation of the new building of the 
Boston Medical Library in 1901, 
the “higher” education of the phy­
sician “so much needed to­day” 
is best achieved through “the silent 
influence of character on charac­
ter and in no way more potently 
than in the contemplation of the 
lives of the great and good of the 
past, in no way more than in ‘the 
touch divine of noble natures 
gone.’ ” A year later, in an address 
